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Abstract: In an ever-evolving technological industry, the oil and gas sector is already moving forward
through the adaptation of Industry 4.0 and the adaptation of advanced cyber technologies through
Oil and Gas 4.0. As IT/OT (information technology/operational technology) systems are evolving
technologically, so are the cyber security threats faced by the offshore oil and gas assets. This paper
aims to raise the awareness of cyber security threats and the organizational and technical measures
that need to be adopted by the oil and gas industry for remote and complex assets in the upstream
sector. A comprehensive literature review covering the areas of new IT/OT systems integration and
cyber security risk analysis and management is presented. The results of a survey on the subject of
cyber security for offshore oil and gas assets are also presented, and they provide valuable insight
into the current industry culture and the perception of cyber security concepts. The importance of
organizational culture, personnel training and involvement, as well as corporate engagement and
support in the subject of cyber security is highlighted.
Keywords: cyber security; offshore; oil and gas; critical infrastructure; survey
1. Introduction
The offshore oil and gas industry is characterized by its global presence and the
dispersion of its upstream assets in all parts of the world. These assets, regardless of
their type, i.e., drills ships, offshore production platforms, or FPSOs (floating production
storage and offloading units), comprise multiple control systems, enabling safe and efficient
exploration and production processes. These systems consist of industrial control systems
(ICS) but combine the remoteness of their assets being offshore, thus sharing attributes
with common maritime assets.
In an era of advanced digitalization of assets both in the maritime and oil and gas sec-
tors, the implementation of digital twin technology, the use of cloud technology for digital
storage, bandwidth, and communication of assets and processes and the IT (Information
Technology) and OT (Operational Technology) systems that are on board offshore oil and
assets, face numerous internal and external cyber security threats. Cyber attacks against
oil and gas companies and the upstream domain have been going on for over 30 years [1].
More recently, it was reported that the percentage of ICS computers which had malicious
objects blocked from accessing grew from 38% in H2, 2019 to 39.9% in H1, 2020 in the
building automation industry, and from 36.3% to 37.8% in the oil and gas industry [2]. In
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the maritime domain as reported in June 2020, an increase of cyber attacks by 400% was
observed since February 2020 for maritime facilities and assets and their IT and OT systems
and infrastructure [3]. The reported percentages of acknowledged cyber attacks indicate
the imminent threat for offshore oil and gas assets.
This paper provides a perspective on cyber security of exploration and production
assets in the offshore oil and gas domain coupled with industry data from a web survey
of employees active in the industry. More specifically, the aim of this paper is to provide
the following:
(a) An overview of available literature in the field of cyber security for offshore (upstream)
oil and gas assets. As part of the literature review, any material exploring cyber
security aspects involving the onshore assets and processes supporting the upstream
sector will also be considered. The midstream and downstream sectors of the oil
and gas industry are not covered in this paper as they are not part of the authors’
research scope.
(b) An up-to-date view of the offshore oil and gas industry’s perception of cyber security
based on a survey of personnel active in the specific sector.
In general, the aim of this paper is to highlight the organizational, operational, and
technical parameters that are influenced by cyber security threats and affect the cyber
operations and integrity of the offshore oil and gas assets.
2. Digitalization and Cyber Integration in the Upstream Oil and Gas Sector
The introduction of data- and computer-driven technologies in the oil and gas sector
is active and ongoing. The industry is embracing the Industry 4.0 era and its adaptation
into “Oil and Gas 4.0” [4], as well as and the use of its digital tools and technologies, as the
industry seeks their organizational and process integration. As outlined by Lu et al. [4],
Industry 4.0 incorporates digital tools such as big data, the Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT), digital twin technology, wireless communication technologies, augmented reality
(AR), and blockchain technology. Other technologies enabling the digital integration of
the upstream oil and gas sector (both offshore and onshore) include machine learning,
cloud computing, and artificial intelligence (AI). Oil and Gas 4.0 is applicable in the seismic
exploration, intelligent oilfield, intelligent completion, and research and decision-making
platforms [4,5].
The use and application of big data in the upstream oil and gas sector was reviewed
in detail by Mohammadpoor and Torabi [6]. Its incorporation into Oil and Gas 4.0 and its
applicability in the exploration and scouting, drilling, reservoir, and production engineering
were outlined by Nguyen et al. [7]. The application of artificial intelligence in upstream
drilling system design and operations was reviewed by Gharbi and Mansoori [8] and Bello
et al. [9]. The digital twin concept was explained in detail by Elgonda LaGrange [10] and
Holmås et al. [11]. The implementation of the Internet of Things (IoT) and its industrial
adaptation in the IIoT was reviewed in detail by Thibaud et al. [12] in direct application to
the oil and gas and energy sector.
In general, all abovementioned digital tools as part of Oil and Gas 4.0 are intercon-
nected and interrelated in order to allow for the connectivity and interoperability of the
information technology (IT) and operations technology (OT) systems within an oil and
gas organization and in particular offshore oil and gas assets. The key components of this
interoperability are the industrial control systems (ICS) and SCADA (supervisory control
and data acquisition).
3. Literature Review on the Subject of Cyber Security in the Offshore Oil and
Gas Domain
From a literature review, it is evident that the subject of cyber security for oil and
gas assets is not widely studied, specifically for the offshore oil and gas domain. A lot of
research has been conducted in the field of industrial cyber security as well as the maritime
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domain, but the offshore oil and gas sector combines the attributes of both onshore facilities
and maritime assets (vessels).
The publications that were identified consist of scientific journal articles and industry
white papers, reports, directives, and standards that cover the following areas:
(a) Cyber security adversaries, threats, and vulnerabilities;
(b) Cyber systems integration as well as risk analysis and management;
(c) Industry and governmental initiatives.
These are outlined below so that the range of current research in the subject is realized.
3.1. Cyber Security Adversaries, Threats, and Vulnerabilities
In general, security threats initiated by adversaries against offshore oil and gas assets
can be categorized as insider, external, or colluded (i.e., insiders working on behalf of
external adversaries) [13]. These are translated to the following types of cyber adversaries:
(a) Cyber criminals: These comprise hackers, organized criminals, etc., seeking financial
benefit through use of stolen digital information or manipulation of physical assets.
(b) State adversaries: They comprise hostile states seeking political advantage, espionage,
destruction of digital assets, sabotage, etc.
(c) Insiders: They comprise disgruntled employees seeking personal benefit through
targeted theft of digital information, destruction of digital assets, sabotage, etc., or
negligent employees causing unwanted incidents [14].
(d) Cyber terrorists [15]: These are terrorist groups seeking sabotage or destruction of
physical assets, and they exploit cyber and physical vulnerabilities for political or
ideological reasons.
(e) Cyber activists: These comprise hacktivists and activist groups causing sabotage
to cyber infrastructure through targeted cyber attacks for political or ideological
purposes.
Soares and Souza [16], Hacquebord and Pernet [17], and Ginter [18] have validated
the above adversaries by providing examples of real-world threat and attack scenarios.
The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) [19], Hacquebord and Pernet [17],
and Dragos Inc. [20] have provided a very comprehensive list of these adversaries, such as
Xenotime, Magnallium (also known as APT 33), Chrysene, Hexane, Dymalloya, and others,
all targeting oil and gas corporations and assets through strategic and opportunistic attacks.
Cyber attack scenarios and consequences that have been noted include the following:
• Remote manipulation of offshore platform OT systems, causing failure of operational
and safety systems [15,20];
• Remote data hijacking and manipulation for targeted physical attacks to maritime and
offshore oil and gas assets [16];
• Sabotage of IT and OT systems by an employee for personal benefit [15];
• A cyber attack scenario on an offshore natural gas asset by the altering of parameters
in the gas hydrate system [21];
• Compromise of a third-party and original equipment manufacturer (OEM) [20], aiming
at the cyber espionage and hacking of IT/OT systems, and infiltrating internal cyber
security barriers of offshore oil and gas assets and organizations;
• Cyber attack against shore-based electric power generation and supply entity of shore-
to-offshore power distribution, aiming at the disruption of upstream and midstream
oil and gas asset operations [20].
The combinations of attack scenarios and methodologies as described above and in
detail by Stergiopoulos et al. [22] and Moreno et al. [23] are numerous. In general, it can be
observed that cyber security threats leading to cyber attack incidents can affect the offshore
oil and gas asset itself along with its IT/OT systems (pumps, remote terminal units, PLCs,
sensors, etc.), its shore-to-offshore infrastructure (pipelines, power and communication
connections), its onshore infrastructure and corporate data centers, supply logistics, IT
control centers, etc.
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For the corporate and onshore infrastructure supporting offshore oil and gas assets,
the adversaries remain the same, but the types of cyber attacks and threats relate more to
the financial sector. Rohmeyer and Bayuk [24] pointed to the theft of funds or data and
operational disruptions as major threats for financial organizations, which correlates to
recent cyber attacks in oil and gas companies. The Saudi Aramco cyber incident affecting
over 30,000 corporate computer systems and causing major supply and operational halt-
ing [25] confirms the disruption threat to the oil and gas sector, its onshore infrastructure,
and its offshore assets. Data leaks and their subsequent financial impact in oil and gas
contract bidding [26] also confirm the impact from data theft or leakage and industrial
espionage as well as the indirect loss of funds. Even though the majority of cyber attack
incidents in the oil and gas domain remain unpublished, the above are realistic examples
of the exploitation of asset vulnerabilities.
In accepting upstream oil and gas sector assets as critical infrastructure, it is un-
derstood that they consist of a complex grid of computation, networking, and physical
operational processes [27], involving assets and systems positioned in multiple remote
locations and at a great distance between them. This makes the upstream oil and gas sector
vulnerable against security threats in the physical and cyber domain. Assuming that cyber
threats are defined as computer or computer network hazards (Lewis 2020), the threats for
critical infrastructure such as offshore oil and gas assets can vary from malicious software
and malware to phishing email exploits [28]. Hacquebord and Pernet [17] as well as Folga
et al. and their Argonne National Laboratory Report [29] and NTT Security [30] provided a
detailed list of such malign threats:
• Infrastructure sabotage: This refers to the use of malware or malicious software for
the manipulation and damage of IT/OT infrastructure, as well as the alteration of
data and equipment operating parameters, all leading to the malfunction and/or
damage/destruction of assets, systems, etc. One example is the Stuxnet virus used in
the attacks against the Iranian uranium-enriching facilities’ OT systems, which also
affect IT systems from the U.S. oil and gas company Chevron [31]. Another example
is the targeted cyber espionage campaign against gas pipeline companies to gather
data for sabotage operations [29].
• Data leaks: These are caused by the unsafe handling or storage of data through web
or file servers as well as through targeted hacking attacks.
• Insider malicious cyber incidents: These comprise insider-led destruction or alteration
of data, theft of intellectual property, and data leakage.
• Attacks on webmail and corporate VPN servers: This is achieved through DNS
(Domain Name Server) hijacking or targeted phishing attacks.
• DNS (domain name server) hijacking: This involves the modification of corporate
domain name servers for the theft of corporate credentials, email communication
interception, access to internal and VPN networks, etc.
• Espionage and data theft: This involves intrusion into corporate IT systems for the
theft of data and/or monitoring of financial transactions, corporate data processing,
etc. This threat scenario was confirmed by the ENISA report ETL 2020 on the cyber
espionage threat landscape [32].
• External emails: These are data leaks caused by the use of external email communica-
tion through corporate or personal computer systems, whereby the unsafe storage or
transmission of data becomes a risk.
• Malware: This comprise adware or spam, trojans, bots (used also for distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) [28], ransomware, rootkit, spyware, viruses, worms [28] that
are used to gain access to IT/OT systems, to remotely intervene, control, or monitor
processes, to access data, etc.
From the types of cyber incidents, threats, and adversaries described, it is evident
that the vulnerabilities, whether already existing or created, derive from the necessary
data transfer between the different functions of an oil and gas asset and organization.
Data transfer between field operations and IT/OT systems to corporate IT systems or data
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centers allows for multiple security breach paths and vulnerabilities [33]. The company
DNV GL [34] has identified the following most prominent vulnerabilities for offshores oil
and gas assets with regard to their cyber security:
(a) Lack of cyber security awareness and training of employees
(b) Remote work during operations and maintenance
(c) Using commercial type IT products with known vulnerabilities in the production
environment
(d) An inadequate cyber security culture among vendors, suppliers and contractors
(e) Insufficient separation and segmentation of data networks
(f) The use of mobile devices and storage units including smartphones
(g) Data networks between on- and offshore facilities
(h) Insufficient physical security of data rooms, cabinets, etc.
(i) Vulnerable software
(j) Outdated and ageing control systems in facilities
All the above are in full correlation to the real incidents described previously, and
they outline the complexity of IT and OT systems and processes as well as a high reliance
on electronic, networked, and remote systems and subsystems resulting in a large attack
surface and many attack vectors [27].
3.2. Cyber Systems Integration and Risk Analysis and Management
In the area of systems integration and cyber security risk management for IT/OT in-
frastructure of offshore oil and gas assets, a number of journal publications were reviewed.
More specifically, Yang, Cao, and Li [35] carried out an analysis of the structure and safety
deficiencies of oil and gas SCADA (supervisor control and data acquisition) network,
aiming to evaluate the limitations of traditional evaluation methods. They proposed a new
network security risk evaluation method of oil and gas SCADA, through a combination of
factor state space and the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method. Vieira, Houmb, and
Insua [36] proposed a graphical model for cyber security risk assessment based on an adver-
sarial risk analysis for the mitigation of cyber security challenges. They also presented an
example of application of the graphical model for an offshore drilling rig, indicating the use
of standard business language based on decisions, risks, and value, but on a more formal
and comprehensive risks analysis method. Prasad and Avadhani [37] presented the design
and analysis of attack trees implemented in offshore oil and gas process complex SCADA
systems. Their aim was to identify system vulnerabilities and expose methodologies used
by attackers when they attempt to take control of the SCADA systems in order to affect hy-
drocarbons production. Refsdal, Solhaug, and Stølen [38] demonstrated the application of
a security risk analysis methodology for the tackling of threat scenarios on a case involving
the introduction of new decision support software technology for the handling of work
permit applications in the oil and gas domain. Their methodology is to calculate the fre-
quency rather than the probability of threat scenarios, and it focuses on the implementation
of system as well as the operational and organizational changes at a corporate and field
level in oil and gas assets. Marcin and Emilian [39] proposed an integrated risk analysis
and assessment methodology compatible with industrial hazard and risk identifications
methods such as HAZOP (hazard and operability), LOPA (layer of protection analysis),
and SVA (security vulnerability analysis). Their methodology addresses risk mitigation
by considering the safety and security requirements as per IEC 61508, IEC 61511, and
IEC 62443 standards and is applied to oil port installations and related critical infrastruc-
ture. Kosmowski and Gołębiewski [40] proposed an approach for the proactive reliability,
functional safety, and cyber security management and predictive risk analysis of oil ports,
hazardous plants, and critical infrastructure by considering the security levels outlined by
the ISPS Code. Their approach was based on the analysis of relevant hazards/threats and
evaluation of related risks, while considering also the perspectives of underwriters and
insurance companies. The implementation of innovative technologies such as Industry 4.0
and the convergence of advanced OT/IT (operational technology/information technology)
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systems were also considered. McEvoy and Wolthusen [41] proposed the use of causal
Bayesian networks to analyze probable attack strategies on a managed pressure drilling
(MPD) system that was on board an offshore oil and gas asset. Their work can assist oil and
gas corporations to realize cyber security risks and recover from cyber attack incidents.
The area of cyber systems integration and their relation to cyber security incidents
and vulnerabilities has been covered by a number of journal articles. From these, Fataliyev
and Mehdiyev [42] investigated the use of Internet of Things in the oil and gas sector and
specifically in the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR from the context of cyber physical
systems. They proposed new approaches for the mitigation of technical problems in inte-
grated smart sensors, the Internet of Things, wireless networks, and cloud technologies for
cyber physical systems. Aalsalem et al. [43] described the application of wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) in the upstream oil and gas sector; they highlighted the cyber security
requirements to ensure the safety and security integrity of infrastructure and to thwart
cyber attacks, network and system failures, and operational disruptions. Similarly, Rad-
mand et al. [44] outlined the various types of cyber attacks in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) for oil and gas assets, and they acknowledged that system vulnerabilities are not
adequately investigated in the industry. Their proposal is to utilize WSNs only for system
redundancy, not allocating them in critical functions, and to consider contingency plans
for their potential interruption or malfunction. Sveen et al. [45] developed a model of
integrated operations for the North Sea wells, targeting the remote operation of offshore oil
and gas assets for the increase of production levels, the reduction of operational costs, and
the extension of lifespan. Their work involved the implementation of new technologies
in an organizational, technical, and operational level and considered the improvement of
system, infrastructure, cultural, and operational security risk management and vulnera-
bility assessment. Similarly, Rydzak et al. [46] used a generic risk matrix and explored
the allocation of resources in infrastructure and systems in offshore oil and gas assets,
aiming at their resiliency built up and reinforcement against cyber threats. Spandonidis
and Giordamlis [47] also acknowledged that cyber security as a factor affects the use of 5G
mobile networks and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) for data-centric operations. Finally,
Erkoyuncu et al. [48] investigated the identification and quantification of IT/OT systems’
software obsolescence in the oil and gas sector. Their developed tools and methodology
that evaluated obsolescence impact, risk exposure, capital and operating expenditure, and
resolution implementation, aiming at the reinforcement of infrastructure from exposed
system vulnerabilities and the elimination of safety and cyber security breaches.
3.3. Industry and Governmental Initiatives
Various governmental entities around the world, industry organizations, and the
oil and gas industry have developed and continued to develop a number of legislations,
directives, standards, and guidelines to proactively and reactively deal with the current and
emerging cyber security threats. A description of such indicative documents specifically
relevant to or created for the offshore oil and gas domain is given below, without being a
conclusive list.
Regarding industry standards, directives, and guidelines, the U.S. National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber Security Framework is the most commonly
used and widely applicable in the USA and elsewhere. It consists of a framework of stan-
dards that capture the operational and technical cyber security requirements of industrial,
maritime and offshore oil and gas assets. It consists of five functions: (1) the identification
of cyber security risks to systems, assets, data, and operations; (2) the protection of assets
by the implementation of safeguards; (3) the detection of cyber security incidents; (4) the
response to cyber security events; and (5) the recovery from cyber security breaches. The
NIST Cyber Security Framework is supplemented by NIST Special Publications 800-30,
800-37, and 800-82, which cover cyber security risk assessment and management for in-
dustrial control systems (ICS). The NIST Cyber Security Framework is also applied by the
standard ASTM F3286-17 (2017), applicable to maritime assets and critical infrastructure.
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Internationally, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have developed and issued a number
of standards applicable to cyber security, such as ISO/IEC 27001, IEC-62443-4-2, IEC
62443-3-3, ISO/IEC 21827, ISO/IEC 15408-1, ISO/IEC 18045, and ISO/IEC 27032. These
cover risk assessment and management, as well as the mitigation of vulnerabilities in
Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS), and they describe the Systems Security
Engineering Capability Maturity Model® (SSE-CMM®).
The American Petroleum Institute (API) has created Recommended Practices (RP), API
RP 70 (2003) and API RP 70I (2003), which are related to the security assessment of offshore
oil and gas assets, and these are applied both in the U.S. and internationally. API has also
published Standard (STD) 780, outlining a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) methodology
for the petroleum and petrochemical industry. The abovementioned API recommended
practices and standards are generic in the planning against or the mitigation of physical
security threats but can also apply to cyber security threats as they would involve IT/OT
systems that are critical for the integrity and safety of assets. For the technically related
subject of cyber security, API Standard 1164 was published to cover the security of SCADA
systems for pipeline assets, covering both the offshore and onshore environments.
In the sector of industry organizations, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
released Resolution MSC.428(98) and IMO Guidance MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 in 2017. Both
address the implementation of maritime risk management in vessels’ safety management
systems (SMSs) in accordance with the ISM (International Safety Management) Code
objectives and requirements, complementing the IMO ISPS (International Ship and Port
Facility Security) code. Both IMO documents apply primarily to maritime assets but do
not exclude maritime oil and gas assets such as drill-ships, FPSOs (floating production
storage and offloading units), and FSRUs (floating storage regasification units). Resolution
MSC.428(98) is also adopted by standard ASTM F3449-20 and is applicable to maritime
assets. Similarly, the International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) has issued
guideline documents “Assessing and Managing Cybersecurity Risks to Drilling Assets
(2015)” and “Guidelines for Baseline Cybersecurity for Drilling Assets (2018)”. They
deal with the assessment and management of cyber security risks and outline existing
international and regional standards, including the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and
ISO/IEC 21827.
In the governmental sector in the U.S., the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Department of Energy (DoE) (2014) developed the Oil and Natural Gas
Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ONG-C2M2) in order to assist the
industry to evaluate and improve their cyber security infrastructure and capacity, im-
plementing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber Security
Framework. In the maritime domain, the U.S. Coast Guard (2020) has issued Navigation
and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01-20, titled “Guidelines for Addressing Cyber
Risks at Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) Regulated Facilities”, providing
guidance to facilities to assess, document, and address computer system and network
cyber vulnerabilities in their assets. NVIC 01-20 covers maritime assets and facilities in the
outer continental shelf and offshore operations, and it covers offshore oil and gas assets
operating under U.S. MTSA provisions. The U.S. Congress (2020) also issued Bill S. 4023
“Enhancing Maritime Cybersecurity Act of 2020”, which delegates the implementation of
cyber security strategies and measures to the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA) and the Maritime Administration (MARAD).
In the European Union, cyber security for the oil and gas sector is addressed from the
spectrum of critical infrastructure protection. European Union Directives 2008/114/EC and
2013/30/EU tackle the critical infrastructure element in general and the safety for offshore
oil and gas assets without explicitly covering cyber security. In particular, 2016/1148/EU
addresses the cyber security of IT networks without specifically specifying the infrastruc-
ture, systems, or assets related to the upstream oil and gas sector. It should also be noted
that a revision to 2016/1148/EU was proposed on December 16, 2020. The European
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Union’s cyber security strategy JOIN/2013/01 was also developed to strategically im-
plement mitigation technologies and policies and to raise cyber resilience and security
levels. As per directive 2019/881/EU, also known as the EU Cybersecurity Act, cyber
security is handled by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA), which develops, recommends, and implements policies, standards, directives,
and technologies to mitigate cyber security threats across the European Union member
states. The ENISA Report of 2016 [49] assessed the oil and gas sector without providing
any specific recommendations.
Finally, in the Asian region, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore published
Shipping Circular No.15 on Maritime Cyber Risk Management, which enforces the require-
ments of IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) and IMO MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3.
In the sector of maritime classification societies, the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) has issued five guidance documents that apply to operators, owners, as well as
vessel construction and integration companies for offshore and maritime assets. These
provide best practices for the implementation of cyber security measures in the operational
and technical level and the application of mitigation measures for information technology
(IT) and operational technology (OT) systems for maritime and offshore assets ensuring
data integrity.
DNV GL in turn has issued recommended practices DNVGL-RP-G108 (2017), DNVGL-
RP-0496 (2016), and DNVGL-CP-0231 (2018). DNVGL-RP-G108 provides a guideline for
the application of the IEC 62443 series of standards in the oil and gas industry in general.
DNVGL-RP-0496 provides guidance to asset owners and operators on enhanced cyber
security practices and resilience management for ships and mobile offshore units. DNV-
CP-0231 describes the certification process for increased cyber security for systems and
components to be installed on board vessels as well as offshore installations.
Lloyd’s Register (LR) developed three guidance notes that cover maritime assets and
the deployment of IT and OT, autonomous ships, and the type approval of cyber-enabled
vessel systems components as well as the LR Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) for the
marine and offshore sector adopting the IMO regulations.
The Japan Maritime Association (Class NK) has issued guideline documents “Guide-
lines for designing Cyber Security Onboard Ships” (Class NK 2020) and “Cyber Security
Management Systems for Ships” (Class NK 2019). These apply to maritime vessels and
column-stabilized drilling units, and they describe the implementation of controls against
cyber threats for IT and OT systems and the implementation, maintenance, and improve-
ment of cyber security management systems for companies and maritime assets aiming at
safe navigation.
The governmental and industry initiatives described in this section are summarized
in Table 1 and are in agreement with the industry regulations and standards outlined by
reports from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) [19], Holcomb from
LEIDOS [49], and the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC)
and Natural Gas Council (NGC) [50,51].
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Table 1. Summary of governmental and industry initiatives related to cyber security.
Category Originator Title
Standards
NIST NIST Special Publications 800-30, 800-37, 800-82
ASTM ASTM F3286-17, ASTM F3449-20
ISO/IEC ISO/IEC 27001, IEC-62443-4-2, IEC 62443-3-3, ISO/IEC 21827, ISO/IEC 15408-1,ISO/IEC 18045, and ISO/IEC 27032
API API RP 70, API RP 70I, API RP 780, API Standard 1164
Industry
organizations
IMO IMO Resolution MSC.428(98), IMO Guidance MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3
IADC
IADC guideline: “Assessing and Managing Cybersecurity Risks to Drilling
Assets (2015)”
IADC guideline: “Guidelines for Baseline Cybersecurity for Drilling Assets (2018)”
Government
DHS and DoE Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (ONG-C2M2)
USCG NVIC 01-20
U.S. Congress Bill S. 4023 “Enhancing Maritime Cybersecurity Act of 2020”
European Union 2008/114/EC, 2013/30/EU, 2016/1148/EU, 2019/881/EU, EU Cybersecurity strategyJOIN/2013/01, ENISA report 2016





ABS “Guidance Notes on the Application of Cybersecurity Principles to Marine and
Offshore Operations—ABS CyberSafety Vol. 1”, September 2016
ABS “Guide for Cybersecurity Implementation for the Marine and Offshore
Industries—ABS CyberSafety Vol. 2”, June 2018 (revised)
ABS “Guidance Notes on Data Integrity for Marine and Offshore Operations—ABS
CyberSafety Vo. 3”, September 2016
ABS “Guide for Software Systems Verification—ABS CyberSafety Vol. 4”,
September 2016
ABS “Guidance Notes on Software Provider Conformity Program—ABS CyberSafety
Vol. 5”, September 2016
DNV GL DNVGL-RP-G108 (2017), DNVGL-RP-G 496 (2016), DNVGL-CP-0231 (2018)
Lloyd’s Register
Lloyd’s Register Guidance Note: Cyber-enabled ships—Deploying information and
communications technology in shipping—Lloyd’s Register’s approach to
assurance, 2016.
Lloyd’s Register Guidance Note: Cyber-enabled ships—ShipRight
procedure—autonomous ships, 2016.
Lloyd’s Register Guidance Note: Cyber-enabled ships—Type Approval of Cyber
Enabled Systems Components, 2016.
Class NK Class NK, “Guidelines for Designing Cyber Security Onboard Ships”, 2nd Ed., July 2020.Class NK, “Cyber Security Management Systems for Ships”, 1st Ed., April 2019.
3.4. COVID-19 and Its Cyber Security Implications in the Offshore Oil and Gas Domain
In extreme situations like the COVID-19 pandemic, the oil and gas industry faced
the same operational difficulties as also faced by many other industry sectors. Both the
personnel working on shore supporting offshore operations and the offshore workers
were equally vulnerable to health issues. Especially for the personnel working offshore,
the COVID-19 situation adversely affected the rotation of personnel’s shifts, prolonged
their time offshore, and prevented shore-to-rig transportation, leading to the reduction
or alteration of maintenance activities in OT and IT systems [52]. This created further
vulnerabilities to OT and IT systems as software security updates were not frequent or
not carried out as scheduled. In addition, the remote working for many oil and gas
professionals on shore resulted in pushing the cyber integration of the industry further and
increasing the vulnerability of systems and organizational functions since cyber security
barriers had to be adapted from the office/industrial plant to the home environment.
People working from their home and supporting the offshore oil and gas industry were
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vulnerable to increased cyber risks from phishing attacks and cyber criminals [53]. It
is evident that all existing mitigation measures for cyber attacks remain valid for these
difficult times where company workers have to use their own common sense for cyber
safety rather than rely on corporate firewalls and IT support. As threats will continue to
evolve, so should the IT and OT infrastructure for oil and gas companies. This could be
achieved by identifying new cyber protection barriers as well as reshaping their IT/OT
infrastructure and move from the decentralized information databases (device-led IT) to
the more centralized infrastructure (server-led IT) where vulnerabilities from personnel
standalone workstations can be reduced by relying on information transfer through virtual
or hosted desktops utilizing on-premises servers or the cloud [53]. The offshore oil and
gas industry has to build resiliency within its organization as well as its operational and
technical infrastructure in order to mitigate cyber security risks in the case of extreme
scenarios such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
4. Industry-Wide Survey on Cyber Security for Offshore Oil and Gas Assets
4.1. Survey Methodology and Objectives
In order to validate the state of cyber security for offshore oil and gas assets, a survey
was carried out between February and July 2020 where input from professionals who en-
gaged actively in the offshore oil and gas industry was requested. Google Forms was used
for creating the survey questionnaire as it was found to be more easily distributed electroni-
cally and could also guarantee the anonymity of the participants. Distribution of the survey
was done using direct communication to individuals through the LinkedIn professional
social media platform as well as through direct email communication to known industry
contacts. The professionals contacted included both “white-collar” and “blue-collar” em-
ployees. The pool of individuals included engineers, technicians, third-party consultants,
superintendents, rig managers, academics, and corporate executives involved directly or
indirectly in the technical, operational, or management side of offshore oil and gas assets.
Individuals employed in government agencies and the military were also contacted as their
work involved the direct or indirect protection of critical infrastructure such as upstream oil
and gas assets. In total, 350 individuals were contacted from companies, prime contractors,
subcontractors, third-party service or consultancy providers and government and military
entities from all over the world. A total of 66 (18.8%) anonymous responses were gathered
and used to analyze data for this publication. It should be highlighted that from those
contacted, a large number did not respond to the survey due to the sensitivity of the cyber
security subject or lack of knowledge in the field. In addition, from the communication
to the survey participants, a large percentage of participants were reluctant to respond
to the survey request and email communication due to confidentiality and cyber security
concerns. Contact with industry organizations such IADC (International Association of
Drilling Contractors) and IOGP (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers) was
attempted for wider distribution of the survey but with no success.
The survey questionnaire was structured in such a way that generic information could
be gathered regarding industry compliance (standards) for cyber security and risk analysis,
the perception of cyber security threats, vulnerabilities, mitigation barriers and incident
consequences in assets and the organizational and personnel delegation of cyber security
duties. More specifically, the survey questionnaire was structured into eight sections. Part 1
gathered generic information on the background of the survey participants (company type,
being an asset owner, contractor, consultant, etc.), as well as the location of the upstream
assets operated. Part 2 collected information on the cyber security training and delegation
of duties for company personnel and contractors involved in the operation or maintenance
of IT and OT assets. Part 3 enquired about the information technology (IT) initiatives
implemented by companies to optimize cyber security and the constraints they faced at a
corporate and field level. Part 4 looked into the perception of cyber security vulnerabilities,
threat scenarios and cyber attack consequences for offshore oil and gas assets. Part 5
examined the operational integration of cyber security onboard offshore oil and gas assets
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in relation to the permit-to-work system, the monitoring of key performance indicators
(KPIs), and the built-in system and asset resiliency. Part 6 explored the organizational
and field asset compliance to industry standards and governmental directives on cyber
and security risk assessment. Part 7 explored the relation of operational process safety
and cyber security measures. Part 8 explored the industry’s reliance on external support
for cyber security services and the adequacy of existing legislative and directives’ cyber
security framework. The process that was followed to implement the design, distribution,
and processing of the survey questionnaire can be seen in Figure 1.
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4.2. Survey Results and Analysis
From the participants of the survey, a 44% represented offshore oil and gas asset
owners, meaning the personnel working in corporations who own such assets. A total
of 29% represented contractors occupied on offshore oil and gas assets, from which 18%
represented contractor companies who operate assets, 3% provides the personnel to operate
assets, and 8% refers to companies providing technical contracted tasks. A total of 23%
represented third-party consultancy companies, from which 18% referred to companies
providing some sort of consultancy services and 5% referred to offshore oil and gas asset
classification or registry organizations. A combined 5% referred also to OEM and aca-
demic institution participants with knowledge of or involvement in the offshore oil and
gas operations.
From the participants’ responses, it was observed that they represented offshore oil and
gas assets, from which 40% were from multiple geographic regions around the world. 29%
were located in Europe, 13% in the Asia Pacific region, 6% in North America, 4% in the CIS
(Commonwealth of Independent States) region representing countries of the post-Soviet
era. In addition, 3% of the assets were located in the Middle East region, 2% in Central
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and South America, 2% in the African continent, and 1% in the Eastern Mediterranean
region. The wide dispersion of assets is evident, and it provides a representative sample of
world-deployed and operated assets and personnel. The described results regarding the
survey participants and representative assets are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
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understanding of the cyber security threats and consequences, 41% the budget restrictions,
and 35% the corporate culture on cyber security. The results of these survey queries are
shown in Figures 7 and 8.
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For the exploration of cyber security vulnerabilities for the offshore oil and gas do-
main, the participants identified the following: portable USB devices (67%), low employee 
awareness (59%), outdated control and monitoring system architecture (53%), number of 
devices with access to critical data (41%), Wi-Fi network (39%), and cloud monitoring and 
control infrastructure (24%). Similarly, for the OT and IT vulnerabilities that can lead to 
cyber security incidents, the company personnel awareness and training was identified 
by 71% of participants. Organizational cyber and physical security culture was identified 
by 62% of participants, followed at 61% by the legacy systems in back-up/secondary asset 
systems, improper integration of new IT systems into existing infrastructure at 56%, and 
the lack of upstream process knowledge from IT personnel at 35%. These statistics are 
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revealed to be used for cyber-related operations and modifications of IT and OT control 
systems, as identified by 67% of participants. The performance of cyber security initiatives 
is being monitored through corporate and operation related key performance indicators 
(KPIs), as shown by 32% of participants. It should be noted that a majority of 41% of par-
ticipants outlined that the use or monitoring of KPIs for cyber security compliance, imple-
mentation, or performance is not known to them, which indicates a lack of internal com-
munication or nonlinear delegation of performance control duties. It should be high-
lighted that through the survey (for 65% of the participants), it was shown that resiliency 
in case of a cyber security breach scenario is integrated into organizations, and that recov-
ery plans are created and implemented as necessary. The above points are shown in Fig-
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From the various standards or directives used by oil and gas companies for cyber
security risk assessment and management, 47% of the participants use ISO 27001 standard
(Information Security Management), 39% use the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS)
code, 39% use API Standard 780 (Security Risk Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum
and Petrochemical Industries), and 21% use NIST SP 800-30 (Guide for Conducting Risk
Assessments). This indicates the use of diverse standards and tools to mitigate and plan
against cyber security threats, covering the industrial, maritime, and IT domain of offshore
oil and gas assets. In addition, regarding the organizational or corporate compliance to
industry standards or directives for the protection of IT and OT systems, survey participants
outlined industry standards ISA 62443, ISA/IEC 62443-4-2, ISA/IC 62443-3-3, and NIST
SPP-82 for corporate compliance. The results of the survey are shown in Figures 16 and 17.
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5. Conclusions
From a comparison between Sections 3 and 4, it is evident that there is no direct
correlation between the literature review and the industry survey carried out. The identified
literature relates to technical aspects involving cyber security while the survey results
merely provide a view of participants’ perceptions on the subject. Some elements identified
in the literature, such as types of threats, vulnerabilities, industry standards, etc., were
used in the design of the survey questionnaire. There is, however, no association between
the derived survey results and the technical issues raised in the reviewed literature. The
identified literature material does not provide quantified analytics that can be compared
with the statistical survey results. This proves that the research described in the literature
focuses on technical issues rather than on the organizational perception of cyber security
threats and their mitigation.
In regard to what has been outlined in Section 4, it is evident that the subject of cyber
security has to be viewed and understood through two different spectrums: the human
element and the corporate organization. This grading derives from the analysis of results
from Figure 8 where the constraints for the implementation of cyber security are presented.
The human element relates to the perceiving and mitigation of threats in the cyber
domain at both a technical and operational level as well as a field and managerial level.
The survey results indicate that from a wide pool of participants from different locations
around the world, the insider threat and the lack of cyber security culture or concept
understanding are ranked higher than most other cyber threats. In particular, 73% of
the participants acknowledged that the cyber security threat from a malicious insider is
probable. This is in agreement with data from other surveys carried out in the subject
where similar results, i.e., 78% as found by Williams and Ciepiela [54], are observed. In
another survey by Ponemon/Siemens [55], the insider threat is recognized, but 65% of the
participants consider the negligent insider threat more probable than the malicious insider
one (15%).
The lack of understanding of cyber security principles and its effect in the operations
or organization in the case of an incident also pose a very credible threat in the proactive
and reactive mitigation of cyber security breach incidents. This is further proven by the
acknowledgement of portable USB devices (the most employee-led piece of equipment)
and low employee awareness as the greatest cyber security vulnerabilities (67% and 48%,
respectively). The lack of awareness was also recognized from other surveys [54], where
43% of the participants identify the lack of end user awareness as a significant threat. The
lack of awareness and supportive corporate culture does not apply only to “blue collar”
personnel such as field engineers and technicians, but also to the higher management. If
cyber security is not fully understood as a concept or as a threat, support for the imple-
mentation of cyber security measures, to include technological tools and policies, will not
be provided. This is acknowledged by 41% of the survey participants and relates to the
financial constraints existing in companies’ organization in authorizing the acquiring of
new tools and the adoption of new measures.
In the level of corporate organization for the oil and gas sector, the survey results
indicate that cyber security is adopted by organizations through the training of personnel
(corporate and contractors), the implementation of a variety of proactive or reactive mitiga-
tion cyber tools, the proficient understanding of industry standards and certifications in the
subject, its incorporation to operational management through the use of the permit-to-work
system, and its field monitoring through operational key performance indicators (KPIs).
In addition, from the participants’ responses, it is revealed that oil and gas companies
have a good understanding of the interrelation of safety and cyber security. Survey results
reveal that oil and gas companies do have disaster recovery plans, and they either rely on
or receive support from external third-party cyber security experts, presumably though
contracted services or corporate collaborations. Collaborations between oil and gas compa-
nies and governmental organizations is also shown through the participation in joint cyber
security exercises.
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From the above, one can understand that the subject of cyber security is conflicting
in its adaptation and understanding from oil and gas companies and their personnel. On
one hand, the implementation of cyber security tools, counter measures, and standards
and policies is shown at a corporate and field level. On the other hand though, the lack
of understanding of cyber security principles and necessity at a field and corporate level
hinders the mitigation of cyber security incidents through the inefficient financial corporate
commitment and the negligence and lack of awareness from field personnel on the subject.
Unequivocally, the implementation of technical measures is directly affected by the people
deciding (i.e., managers) the funding of the necessary tools for cyber security or those
specifying and requesting (engineers, technicians, etc.) these tools.
Some suggested organizational and technical measures for the offshore oil and gas
domain to tackle cyber security are as follows:
• The adaptation of measures for the mitigation of insider threats: As illustrated from the
survey results, insider-led malicious acts rank high in their probability to occur. Their
mitigation is considered difficult as they constitute a hybrid type of threats that can
include criminal intent, unintentional actions, as well as state sponsored espionage.
These measures can be methods and tools used by the military and government
sectors that could be replicated to the possible extent in order to tackle these threats in
a proactive manner.
• The implementation of countermeasures against hostile unmanned platforms (i.e.,
UAVs, UUVs, USVs): Unmanned platforms or drones are continuously advancing in
performance and technological characteristics and pose a significant threat that can
cause electronic interference or even attack against network-connected devices [56].
Countermeasures to be implemented should consider the special operational condi-
tions of offshore oil and gas assets and should not impede the safety of infrastructure,
systems, or personnel. These countermeasures can be electronic countermeasures or
kinetic-type of weapons that neutralize such airborne, surface, or underwater threats,
similar to the ones used by the military or government security agencies.
• The improvement of corporate and industry culture on the perception of cyber security:
This is a difficult feat that can be achieved through the study of known attacks in the
industry, the sharing of information on such attacks through industry organizations,
the increased communication between industry sectors and companies’ departments,
and the increased and continuous training of individuals on the subject. These are
also suggested by government and industry reports from Folga et al. and the Argonne
National Laboratory [29].
• The increased monitoring of cyber security performance indicators through the use of
corporate KPIs
• The increased collaboration with the government and the military for the training
of personnel, simulation of attack scenarios, and general raising of awareness on the
subject at a legislative and national security level
• The abolition of USB devices from the available toolkit of the offshore oil and gas
domain: This could be achieved by the further integration of IIoT and wireless com-
munication but with their enhanced security features.
• The increased capital and operational expenditure for cyber security measures dictated
by industry standards and national legislation: As the offshore oil and gas sector is
considered critical for many national economies and supporting numerous others
critical infrastructures, it is obvious that funding and resources need to be allocated to
increase asset and organizational resiliency.
To conclude, the oil and gas industry has to recognize that cyber security threats are
persistent and continuously evolving to be more sophisticated and technologically ad-
vanced. In order for oil and gas companies to protect their assets, they need to acknowledge
and understand the threat and the necessity for organizational and technical measures
to be adopted. Any measures to be considered need to be dynamically evaluated and
implemented in order to ensure that oil and gas organizations and their assets are catching
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up with the advancement of their cyber adversaries. Resiliency has to be built into the
organizational, operational, and technical level of oil and gas companies in order to maxi-
mize the possibility of repelling cyber attacks and minimize the technical and corporate
consequences of cyber breaches, especially for remote offshore assets. Consideration should
also be given to the future evolution of threats through the weaponization of malware
and high precision and targeted attacks to critical oil and gas infrastructure and IT/OT
systems. Lastly, the parameter of physical security should not be neglected, as its failure or
inadequacy can impede insider threat mitigation measures.
6. Limitations and Future Work
The authors have attempted to provide an overview of all literature that is relevant to
the cyber security aspects of offshore oil and gas assets. It is possible that some literature
material may have been missed due to its unavailability at the time of the writing of this
article. As cyber security threats evolve and cyber attacks are being more known to the
industry, more publications on the subject are being released.
It has to be understood that the technical and operational cyber security vulnerabil-
ities of offshore oil and gas assets are shared to some extent by assets in the midstream
and downstream oil and gas sector, the chemical and processing sector, as well as the
maritime sector. In order to capture the full spectrum of literature available and validate
the commonalities or differences, it would be beneficial to consider an extensive review of
such available material in the future.
In order to gain a better understanding of the cyber security technical and operational
vulnerabilities of and threats faced by offshore oil and gas assets, the physical security
aspects should be further investigated as they directly influence their cyber operations
and resiliency.
It has to be acknowledged that the survey questionnaire used for capturing the
industry’s perception on the subject of cyber security for offshore oil and gas assets involves
a risk of receiving biased or incorrect feedback from participants. The quality of the
collected data depends on knowledge, experience, and willingness from the participants
to share information. This risk was accepted by the authors as it was found that there
was no other method to pursue the anonymous collection of information in the subject
from a wider pool of participants. The difficulty of determining or certifying the level of
knowledge or competence in cyber security for survey participants is also recognized by
the authors, considering the structure and design of the used survey questionnaire.
It should be also highlighted that very early at the distribution of the survey question-
naire, a large number of negative responses were received that declined any participation
in the dissemination of any information on the aspects of cyber security for offshore oil and
gas assets. The subject was considered by many participants in the companies, government,
and military as sensitive, as it covers industry confidential and national security informa-
tion. Many responses were also received from individuals declining to participate in the
questionnaire due to their lack of knowledge in the specific subject. Attempts to pursue
the distribution of the survey questionnaire by industry organizations such as the IADC
(International Association of Drilling Contractors) and IOGP (International Association
of Oil and Gas Producers) were unsuccessful. It was thought that if the survey effort had
received the endorsement of such organizations, a larger pool of participants could be
accessed, which in turn could provide more valuable data. It is recommended that for the
collection of more reliable data on the subject, the support or endorsement of industry
organizations should be sought.
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